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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. STATUTORY REVISION OF DOMESTIC LAW
A. Removal of Gender-Based Classifications
The United States Supreme Court held in Orr v. Orr1 that a
statutory scheme imposing alimony obligations on husbands but
not wives violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 The Alabama statutes invalidated in that case
were similar to several statutes then in effect in South Carolina.3
The Orr decision, therefore, cast serious doubt on the constitu-
tionality of the South Carolina alimony and support statutes.
In Orr, the Supreme Court ruled that "'to withstand scru-
tiny' under the Equal Protection Clause, '"classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' ''4
In holding that gender was not a reliable "proxy" for need, the
Court observed that because the Alabama laws already provided
for individualized hearings to consider the parties' relative
financial circumstances, a gender-based distinction was gratui-
tous.5 The Court concluded that the individual hearings were
sufficient to protect needy spouses or to compensate women for
past discrimination, without placing burdens solely on husbands
and without reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place for
women and their need for special protection.' In response to Orr,
the South Carolina General Assembly, on May 8, 1979, enacted
several amendments to the state's domestic relations laws and
related provisions.7 Most significantly, alimony and support pro-
visions were made applicable to both husbands and wives.8
1. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
2. Id. at 283.
3. These statutes were codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-120 to -150, -170 (1976).
4. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979)(quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
316-17 (1977)(quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))).
5. 440 U.S. at 281-82.
6. Id. at 280-83.
7. 1979 S.C. Acts 118, No. 71 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21-810 to -830,
-1020, 20-3-120 to -150, -170, 20-7-40 (Cune. Supp. 1979)).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21-810 to -830, -1020, 20-3-120 to -150, -170, 20-7-40 (Cum.
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Prior to 1979, South Carolina family support, protection,
and alimony statutes required that husbands assume greater
obligations than wives. The 1979 amendments, throughsimple
grammatical changes, removed t h o s e gender-based classifica-
tions." These changes will have significant impact on the state's
domestic law.
Sections 20-3-120 and 20-3-130 of the South Carolina Code
were amended to allow the award of alimony to husbands as well
as wives. 10 The amendment to section 20-3-130 further provides
that no alimony shall be granted to an adulterous "spouse." '11 As
amended, section 14-21-820 now provides that either a husband
or a wife may be charged with the support of the other spouse,
and the support of their children. 12 Pursuant to this amend-
Supp. 1979).
9. The 1979 amendment to § 20-3-120, for example, substituted the words "either
party" for "the wife, whether she be plaintiff or defendant," and added "him" or "his"
whenever the feminine pronoun was used.
Family courts now have jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings for support of a
"spouse" or child. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-820 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The 1979 amendment
added the words "or wife" to the first phrase of the statute and deleted a provision
charging the mother with support of a child whose father is dead, incapable of support-
ing his child, or not within the state. The statute now provides:
A husband or wife declared to be chargeable with the support of his or her
spouse and children, if possessed of sufficient means or a b 1 e to earn such
means, may be required to pay for their support a fair and reasonable sum
according to his or her means, as may be determined by the court.
Id. Formerly, courts could compel support for wives and children only. 1968 S.C. Acts
2718, No. 1195.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides as follows:
In every divorce action from the bonds of matrimony either party may in
his or her complaint or answer or by petition pray for the allowance to him or
her of alimony and suit money and for the allowance of such alimony and suit
money pendente lite. If such claim shall appear well-founded the court shall
allow a reasonable sum therefor.
Section 20-3-130, as revised, provides as follows:
In every judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony the court shall
make such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money of either
party or any allowance to be made to him or her and, if any, the security to be
given as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case may
be just. No alimony shall be granted an adulterous spouse. In any award of
permanent alimony the court shall have jurisdiction to order periodic pay-
ments or payment in a lump sum.
Id. § 20.3-130.
11. Id. This provision will, in all probability, have no practical effect upon the pre-
sent status of the law. Very few husbands will be granted alimony, and thus, their adul-
tery will have no alimony-related effect.
12. Id. § 14.21-820.
2
outh Carolina aw Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss1/8
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ment, family courts now will assess the financial situation of
each party to determine which spouse must provide support.
South Carolina courts always have considered to some extent
the wife's employment"' and the income from her separate es-
tate in determining support.14 Now, however, a wife's earning
ability and her assets, as well as the income from those assets,
will be considered by the courts not only in determining the
amount of support payments but also in selecting which party
should make them. Indeed, with the amendment to section 14-
21-830, authorizing either custodial parent to bring an action for
child support, a husband who has custody of the children, could
bring an action against his employed wife for support for their
children. If she has assets with which she could pay support, or
has the ability to earn sufficient means to assist in the support
of the children, she may be held liable.1 5
Section 20-7-40 of the South Carolina Code, which formerly
dealt with the obligation of the husband and father to support
his wife and children, has been amended to make the support
obligation applicable to either spouse." In addition, provisions
13. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 185 S.C. 815, 194 S.E. 640 (1938).
14. See Simonds v. Simonds, 225 S.C. 211, 81 S.E.2d 344 (1954).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-830 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The section provides as follows:
(a) The court shall have jurisdiction and a spouse may be required to
furnish support or may be liable for non-support, as provided above, if, at the
time of the filing of the petition for support:
(1) he or she is residing or domiciled in the county or when such area is
the matrimonial domicile of the parties;
(2) he or she is not residing or domiciled in the area referred to in item
(1) but if found therein at such time provided the petitioner is so residing or
domiciled at such time;
(3) he or she is neither residing or domiciled nor found in such area but,
prior to such time and while so residing or domiciled, he or she shall have
failed to furnish such support or shall have abondoned his or her spouse or
child and thereafter shall have failed to furnish such support provided that the
peitioner is so residing or domiciled at that time.
(b) The petitioner need not continue to reside or be domiciled in such
area where the cause of action arose, as provided in items (2) and (3) of this
section, if the conduct of the respondent has been such as to make it unsafe or
improper for him or her to so reside or be domiciled and the petitioner may
bring action in the court of the jurisdiciion wherein he or she is thusly residing
or has become domiciled.
Id.
16. Id. § 20-7-40. The amended statute reads:
(A) Any able-bodied person capable of earning a livelihood who shall,
without just cause or excuse, abandon or fail to provide reasonable support to
1980]
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were inserted that relieve a husband or wife abandoned by his or
her spouse of liability for the support of the abandoning spouse
unless that spouse offers to return. The obligation of support
continues, however, if t h e misconduct of the nonabandoning
husband or wife justified abandonment by the other.
17
The extent of the support obligation was also expanded by
amendment. Previously, the husband was required to provide
merely the "actual necessities of life"1" to his wife and children.
Under the amended statute, a spouse is required to provide
"reasonable support"' 9 which is defined as "an amount of
financial assistance which, when combined with the support the
member is reasonably capable of providing for himself or herself,
will provide a living standard. for the member substantially
equal to that of the person owing the duty to support. It
includes both usual and unusual necessities.
20
The 1979 amendments to section 20-7-40 retain the penalty
for nonsupport of imprisonment for up to one year or a fine of
his or her spouse or to his or her minor unmarried legitimate or illegitimate
child dependent upon him or her shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction shall be imprisoned for a term of not exceeding one year or be
fined not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand five hun-
dred dollars, or both, in the discretion of the court. A husband or wife aban-
doned by his or her spouse is not liable for the support of the abandoning
spouse until such spouse offers to return unless the misconduct of the husband
or wife justified the abandonment. If a fine be imposed the court may, in its
discretion, order that a portion of the fine be paid to a proper and suitable
person or agency for the maintenance and support of the defendant's spouse or
minor unmarried legitimate or illegitimate child. As used in this section "rea-
sonable support" means an amount of financial assistance which, when com-
bined with the support the member is reasonably capable of providing for him-
self or herself, will provide a living standard for the member substantially
equal to that of the person owing the duty to support. It includes both usual
and unusual necessities.
(B) Any person who fails to receive the support required by this section
may petition to a court of competent jurisdiction for a rule to show cause why
the obligated person should not be required to provide such support and after
proper service and hearing the court shall in all appropriate cases order such
support to be paid. Any such petition shall specify the amount of support re-
quired. Compliance with the court order shall bar prosecution under the provi-
sions of subsection (A) of this section.
Id.
17. Id.
18. This is the language found at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-40 (1976).
19. Id. § 20-7-40(A) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
20. Id.
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three hundred to fifteen hundred dollars, or both,2 but adds a
provision allowing a person who fails to receive support to peti-
tion the court for a rule to show cause why the obligated person
should not be required to provide such support.2 2 After a hear-
ing, the court can order payment of the support. If the nonsup-
porting party complies with the order, he or she cannot be pros-
ecuted- for nonsupport. s
Section 14-21-1020 of the South Carolina Code was substan-
tially amended to give family courts jurisdiction over actions
concerning divorce, separate support and maintenance, separa-
tion, and settlement of all legal and equitable rights to the real
and personal property of the marriage.2 This amendment seems
to have broadened the theory of equitable distribution 25 to the
extent that it is relevant in any marital litigation. Since Orr
forbids unjustified gender-based classifications, contribution of
both spouses to the financial success of the family must be con-
sidered in determining an equitable division of the property.
By deleting almost all2 gender-based classifications from
South Carolina statutes dealing with family law, the 1979
amendments removed certain traditional presumptions about
the more favored entitlement of women. Orr, however, has re-
21. Id.
22. Id. § 20-7-40(B).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 14-21-1020. The amended statute provides:
The court shall have all power, authority and jurisdiction by law vested in
the circuit courts of the State in actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii, sep-
arate support and maintenance, legal separation, and in other marital litigation
between the parties, and for settlement of all legal and equitable rights of the
parties in such actions in and to the real and personal property of the marriage
and attorneys' fees, if requested by either party in the pleadings.
Id. The amendment deleted reference to divorce a mensa et thoro, a cause of action
which no longer exists in South Carolina. Nocher v. Nocher, 268 S.C. 503, 510, 234
S.E.2d 884, 887 (1977). S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-140 (Cum. Supp. 1979) includes no refer-
ence to divorce a mensa et thoro. The phrase was replaced with the words "separate
support and maintenance, legal separation, or other marital litigation between the par-
ties." Id.
25. The theory of equitable distribution was articulated in Wilson v. Wilson, 270
S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978), which held that when a wife makes direct or indirect
material contributions to the financial success of the family that assist in the acquisition
of property in the name of the husband, the wife is entitled to a division of that prop-
erty, even though no funds or efforts were contributed toward any specific property.
26. One statute not amended, but containing a provision of questionable constitu-
tionality under Orr, is S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-21-10 (1976), which refers to a father's com-
mon-law obligation to support his children.
5
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quired not only amendment of South Carolina domestic rela-
tions statutory law; it also has affected the gender-based classifi-
cations that pervade the state's common law.
For instance, removal of gender as the basis for family-law
decisions may require replacement of the already weakened
tender-years doctrine with a gender-neutral test. The tender-
years doctrine is "the oft approved principle that, generally, all
things being equal, a child of tender years should be with the
mother. '27 This preference for the mother in cases involving the
custody of young children, however, is merely presumptive and
in South Carolina the long-standing policy already has been to
decide custody cases upon the welfare and best interests of the
child.28 Additionally, after Orr and the 1979 amendments to the
South Carolina Code, the concept of a privileged suitor, under
which the wife has been allowed to petition for temporary ali-
mony and suit money upon a prima facie showing of entitle-
ment,29 may no longer be valid. Finally, it previously has been
held that "under the settled law of this State, the husband has
the right, acting reasonably, to choose where the family shall re-
side, and when the wife refuses to go with him, she is guilty of
desertion." 0 This rule, based solely on the sex of the spouse, is
not consistent with Orr, which favors individualized hearings
and rejects sexual stereotypes if the state purposes are served
equally well by gender-neutral classification.31
27. Stutz v. Funderburk, 272 S.C. 273, 277, 252 S.E.2d 32, 34 (1979).
28. In Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 140, 245 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1978), the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the paternal grandparents of an eight-year-old child
should retain custody when the grandparents had come to be regarded by the child as
her parents and the mother had adopted a "bohemian life style." This reasoning was
reiterated in Skinner v. King, 272 S.C. 891, 252 S.E.2d 891 (1979), a case in which the
parental preference was overcome by the best interests of the child and custody was
retained by the maternal grandparents. In Skinner, as in Cook, the child originally was
placed voluntarily by the mother with the grandparents, and neither the father's nor the
mother's circumstances had changed sufficiently to warrant transfer of custody.
29. Poliakoff v. Poliakoff, 251 S.C. 390, 395-96, 70 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1952). The stat-
ute allowing the wife alimony and attorneys' fees pendente lite has been amended to
conform to the gender-neutral classification of Orr. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (Cum.
Supp. 1979)(complete text at note 10 supra).
30. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 220 S.C. 437, 440, 68 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1951).
31. See text accompanying notes 5 & 6 supra.
[Vol. 32
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B. Attorneys' Fees
The same act that abolished gender-based classifications
also authorized placement of a lien on any property owned by
a person ordered to pay attorneys' fees in a divorce action.
32
Adoption of this section was probably an attempt by the legisla-
ture to offset the effect of the South Carolina Supreme Court's
holding in Louthian & Merritt, P.A. v. Davis.3 It is unclear,
however, to what extent section 20-3-145 of the South Carolina
Code overrules Louthian.
In Louthian, the wife was awarded temporary alimony and
attorneys' fees pendente lite in an action for divorce. Before en-
try of the final divorce decree, however, the wife died.34 Shortly
thereafter, the standing master determined that the husband
should be required to pay his wife's attorneys' fees.3 5 The trial
court found that the master's report was null and void due to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the South Carolina Su-
preme Court agreed. The court, in an opinion by Justice Greg-
ory, held that an action for divorce, being purely personal, ter-
minates on the death of either spouse. If one party to a divorce
action dies before entry of a final decree, the action abates and
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the
matter terminates. Since the trial court was authorized to award
attorneys' fees only in an action for divorce, and since the wife's
death abated that action, the trial court in Louthian lacked ju-
risdiction to consider the question of awarding attorneys' fees.36
Furthermore, the court pointed out that under section 20-3-
120 attorneys' fees are awarded to the wife only.87 The trial
32. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-3-145 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This new section provides:
In any divorce action any attorney fee awarded by the court shall consti-
tute a lien on any property owned by the person ordered to pay the attorney
fee and such attorney fee shall be paid to the estate of the person entitled to
receive it under the order if such person dies during the pendency of the di-
vorce action.
Id. Revision of § 20-3-140 apparently makes this section applicable to all marital litiga-
tion between the parties. Id. § 20-3-140.
33. 272 S.C. 330, 251 S.E.2d 757 (1979).
34. Id. at 331, 251 S.E.2d at 758.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 332-33, 251 S.E.2d at 758.
37. Section 20-3-120, as it read in the 1976 Code, was amended after the Louthian
decision by 1979 S.C. Acts 118, No. 71 to allow either party to a divorce action to peti-
tion for alimony and suit money during litigation. This provision is now codified at S.C.
1980]
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court is not authorized to make the allowance directly to the
wife's attorney. "The attorney is not a party to the divorce ac-
tion and he can neither seek nor be awarded attorneys' fees from
the husband."3 Only the wife can pursue a claim against the
husband for fees-a claim that is abated along with the divorce
action if either party dies before entry of final judgment. If an
attorney is to recover his fee, then, under Louthian, his only re-
course is against his client. The court suggested that cotmsel
representing the wife file a claim for fees against her estate.-9
This discussion in Louthian appears to contradict the
court's holding in Darden v. Whitham. ° In that 1974 case, the
court held that a lower court's issuance of an order requiring
payment directly to the wife's attorney was a tradition in this
state and that "[n]ormally, there is no reason to contest such
payment and this Court is not aware of any evils growing out of
the practice."
'41
Section 20-3-145 apparently was written to ensure that at-
torneys will be paid for their labors. The revision, however,
leaves many questions unanswered. On its face, the statute does
not give the protection the legislature apparently intended. The
jurisdictional problem confronted in Louthian is not addressed
in the statute. If a party to the divorce dies before the final de-
cree, does the statute give the trial court subject matter jurisdic-
tion to award fees? The provision also leaves unclear the method
by which the liens will be recorded and enforced to ensure pay-
ment of fees. The likely procedure under this new section will be
to enter the order awarding attorneys' fees as a judgment
against the spouse ordered to pay the fee, and in favor of the
other spouse. This procedure may require some indication of the
fee lien in the judgment file and apparently would require attor-
neys to enter satisfaction of judgment upon payment of the
awarded fees. Enforcement of the lien upon nonpayment, could
be either by levy and execution or contempt, the latter probably
being more expeditious. Other questions left unanswered are
whether a judgment for fees should bear interest and whether a
CoDE ANN. § 20-3-120 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
38. 272 S.C. at 333, 251 S.E.2d at 758-59.
39. Id. at 333-34, 251 S.E.2d at 759.
40. 263 S.C. 183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974).
41. Id. at 195, 209 S.E.2d at 47.
112 [Vol. 32
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transcript of judgment should be filed.
C. One-Year Separation
South Carolina's statute enumerating grounds for divorce
was amended in 1979 to recognize continuous separation for only
one year as grounds for divorce. 2 South Carolina is the only
state that includes divorce provisions in its constitution; thus, a
constitutional amendment was required to allow a reduction of
the statutory period.4 3 The amendment reducing the separation
period from three years to one year was approved by the state's
voters in the 1978 general election and became effective in Feb-
ruary, 1979.
The statutory waiting period in a divorce sought on grounds
of desertion or separation for one year was also reduced.4 Under
the amended provisions, a two-month delay between the filing of
the complaint and the reference was eliminated. A hearing may
now be held and a decree issued as soon as a defendant files
responsive pleadings or is held to be in default.45
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979). This subsection provides in
pertinent part:
No divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be granted except upon one
or more of the following grounds, to wit:
(5) On the application of either party if and when the husband and wife
have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of one year. A
plea of res judicata or of recrimination with respect to any other provision of
this section shall not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce on this
ground.
Id.
43. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, (1947, amended 1979).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-80 (Cur. Supp. 1979). This section provides as follows:
No reference shall be had before two months after the filing of the com-
plaint in the office of the Clerk of Court, nor shall a final decree be granted
before three months after such a filing.
Provided, however, that when the plaintiff seeks a divorce on the grounds
of desertion or separation for one year, the hearing may be held and the decree
issued after the responsive pleadings have been filed or after the respondent
has been adjudged to be in default whichever occurs sooner.
Id.
45. Once a pleading has been filed and served, a period of twenty days is allowed so
that the other party may answer. Id. § 15-13-310 (1976). This period may be extended.
Id. § 15-3-90; S.C. CIR. CT. R. 19. Under the amendment to § 20-3-80, if a defendant in a
divorce action on grounds of separation or desertion is served and answers immediately,
the hearing could be held in a matter of days, and a final decree could be granted long
before the original three-month waiting period between filing and final decree had
9
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The one-year separation amendment follows a national
trend away from the traditional notion that one spouse must be
guilty of some injury to the other before divorce may be granted,
and toward a more simple no-fault standard. Some states grant
a divorce on the basis of "irretrievable breakdown" or for mere
"incompatibility.' 6 Other states, including South Carolina, rec-
ognize that a marriage has ended for all practical purposes if the
parties have lived apart for a prescribed period of time without
cohabitation. The time periods range from six months in the
District of Columbia to five years in Idaho.47 The one-year pe-
riod of separation required by South Carolina law as grounds for
divorce is now shorter than in the majority of jurisdictions.
II. SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
In Zwerling v. Zwerling,'8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that separation agreements contracted between hus-
band and wife that are not merged or incorporated into a di-
vorce decree, or do not arise from a statutory duty of family sup-
port, are outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the family
courts. Zwerling concerned an action brought by a wife domi-
ciled in New York to enforce three money judgments for support
payments that were past due under the parties' separation
agreement. Each judgment was obtained in New York after per-
sonal service upon the husband who was living in South Caro-
lina. The action to enforce the judgments originally was brought
in the court of common pleas, but was transferred to the family
court by voluntary order of the circuit judge. The family court
refused to enforce the New York judgments after finding that
the New York court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
husband.'9
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the wife
contended that the family court was without jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action and the supreme court agreed. 50
elapsed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-80 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
46. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297, 300-
02 (1977).
47. Id. at 302.
48. 273 S.C. 292, 255 S.E.2d 850 (1979).
49. Id. at 294, 255 S.E.2d at 851.
50. Id.
[Vol. 32
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The court found that since the support obligation the wife
sought to enforce did not arise either from a statutory duty of
family support or from a duty that was judicially imposed as a
consequence of a divorce decree, the husband's only obligation
to contribute to the support and maintenance of the wife arose
from the separation agreement entered into between the parties
prior to their divorce.51 The agreement was negotiated and exe-
cuted as a contract between the parties and the court held that
the contractual nature of the agreement was not altered by the
parties' divorce because the divorce decree was not merged with
the agreement.5 2 Thus, any obligation arising under that agree-
ment was enforceable only by ordinary contract remedies
outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the family court.53
Although the court may have found compelling reasons to
remove unincorporated separation agreements from the jurisdic-
tion of the family court, the decision in Zwerling runs counter to
the recent enlargement and unification of the state's family
court system.54 There are strong arguments, which provided im-
petus for the unification, that all domestic proceedings should be
handled exclusively by family courts. A separation agreement,
incident to a divorce though not merged with the decree, con-
cerns the support of a spouse and the settlement of all legal and
equitable rights of the parties to a marriage. These are matters
over which the family courts ordinarily have jurisdiction.55
Under Zwerling, however, it is necessary to specifically merge
the agreement into the divorce decree to ensure that the family
court will retain jurisdiction to enforce support payments pro-
vided in a separation agreement.
51. Id. at 294-95, 255 S.E.2d at 852.
52. Id. at 295, 255 S.E.2d at 852.
53. Id. The supreme court reiterated this view in McGrew v. McGrew, 273 S.C. 556,
257 S.E.2d 743 (1979), and overruled a family court determination of arrearage due
under a separation agreement that had not been incorporated in any divorce decree.
54. In 1976, the General Assembly placed family courts under a unified statewide
system, establishing one court for each judicial district, and giving family courts exclu-
sive jurisdiction in matters over which they had previously been given jurisdiction under
the Family Court Act of 1968. See Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South Caro-
lina Law, 30 S.C.L. REV. 69, 84 (1979).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21-820, -1020 (1976).
1980]
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III. CHILD SUPPORT PAST AGE OF MAJORITY
Section 14-21-810 of the South Carolina Code, the jurisdic-
tional statute for family courts, has been amended to provide
that all orders for support of a child shall run until the child is
eighteen years of age except in specified circumstances.56 For-
merly, the statute designated twenty-one as the age at which
child support would end.57 The South Carolina Supreme Court,
in Cason v. Cason,5 a 1978 case, determined that a family court
has no authority to compel a parent to support his or her child
beyond the age of eighteen absent a finding by the court that a
parent had agreed to do so.59 A problem arises, however, in in-
terpreting the statute's provision that "exceptional circum-
stances"60 may require support after a child reaches eighteen.
The supreme court considered this issue in Risinger v. Ris-
inger.6' In that case, the husband appealed an order from a fam-
ily court, alleging that the family court had no power to order
him to support an adult child over eighteen while the child was
attending school. The supreme court affirmed the order of the
family court 62 pointing out that the need for education is the
most likely additional "exceptional circumstance" that might
justify continued financial support. The court concluded that
"[c]hildren over 18 with a physical or mental disability, and chil-
dren over 18 in need of further education, have much in com-
mon. In each case, the child's ability to earn is either diminished
or entirely lacking.""3 Such a comparison between children with
disabilities and students might be considered questionable. The
court, however, held that any doubt concerning the family
court's power to make such an order for support should be re-
solved in favor of that power in order to promote the welfare of
the child, the family, and the state.64
56. Id. § 14-21-810(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
57. This provision was found in § 14-21-810(b)(4) of the 1976 Code.
58. 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673 (1978).
59. Id. at 399, 247 S.E.2d at 675-76 (1978).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-810(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
61. 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
62. Id. at 38, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court quoted S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-160 (1976) which provides:
This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that families whose
unity or well-being is threatened shall be assisted and protected, and restored
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The court refrained from listing each specific circumstance
under which a divorced parent might be ordered to pay for edu-
cational expenses of a child over eighteen years of age. Guide-
lines were established, however, to assist the family court in its
determination. "[A] family court judge may require a parent to
contribute that amount of money necessary to enable a child
over 18 to attend high school and four years of college, where
. ..there is evidence that: (1) the characteristics of the child
indicate that he or she will benefit from college; (2) the child
demonstrates the ability to do well, or at least make satisfactory
grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise go to school; and (4) the
parent has the financial ability to help pay for such an
education.
6 5
The obligation to finance a child's higher education is even
greater when a parent has previously agreed to do so. In Clark v.
Jones,66 a divorced father and mother had entered into an agree-
ment in 1973 providing that the mother's petition for an in-
crease in child support would be abandoned if the father would
help pay for the higher education of his children. The South
Carolina Supreme Court held that since the father had benefited
from the agreement and had income sufficient to help defray
his daughter's college expenses, he was obligated to comply with
his agreement and to pay one-half of his daughter's college
expenses.
67
A divorced parent's obligation to provide a college educa-
tion, however, is not unconditional. In Bearden v. Bearden,68 the
supreme court held that concomitant with a divorced parent's
obligation to pay college expenses for his child was the child's
obligation to apply himself to his college education.69 In that
case, the father was found justified in refusing to continue pay-
if possible as secure units of law-abiding members, and that each child coming
within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive, preferably in his own home,
the care, guidance and control that will conduce to his welfare and the best
interests of the State, and that when he is removed from the control of his
parents the court shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which they should have given him.
Id. at 38-39, 253 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting S.C. CoDE: ANN. § 14-21-160 (1976)).
65. Id. at 39, 253 S.E.2d at 653-54.
66. 272 S.C. 456, 252 S.E.2d 564 (1979).
67. Id. at 458-59, 252 S.E.2d at 564-65.
68. 272 S.C. 378, 252 S.E.2d 128 (1979).
69. Id. at 382, 252 S.E.2d at 128 (1979).
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ing his son's college expenses when it was demonstrated that the
son was not doing acceptable college-level work.70
Whether a parent may be required to pay expenses for a
college education for his or her child is one of the most com-
monly litigated questions in child-support cases. 1 One of the
more serious problems in such cases is whether there is a reason-
able ground for making the distinction between adult children of
divorced parents and adult children of married parents. Married
parents legally may choose to discontinue support of their chil-
dren who have reached the age of eighteen. 2 Courts, however,
increasingly are willing to consider a college education to be a
necessity in today's society.7 s Those courts may see it as their
duty to ensure that disadvantages of children of divorced par-
ents are minimized, reasoning that a child of divorced parents
should be able to obtain the same advantages he would have had
but for the divorce, as long as his and society's interests are
served and the parents suffer no undue hardship. This seemed
to be the reasoning of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Ris-
inger. A question arises, however, whether the state's interest in
the welfare of the child is sufficiently compelling to overcome a
constitutional challenge based on equal protection. 4 The su-
preme court soon may be confronted with this question as fam-
ily courts continue to order child support for college expenses
past the age of majority.
Vickie R. Steele
70. Id.
71. H. CLARK, THE LAw oF DOzisuc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.1, at 497
(1968).
72. See Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 31, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1956).
73. Id. at 498.
74. For a case holding that an order compelling payment of child support, including
college expenses, beyond the child's majority was within the judge's discretion and that
the authorizing statute was constitutional, see Childrens v. Childrens, 89 Wash. 2d 592,
575 P.2d 201 (1978), noted in 17 J. FAe. L. 604 (1979).
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